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ARTICLES
TRY, TRY AGAIN: WILL CONGRESS EVER GET IT
RIGHT? A SUMMARY OF INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY
LAWS PROTECTING CHILDREN AND POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS
Susan Hanley Kosse *
"[Sipeech within the rights of adults to hear may not be silenced
completely in an attempt to shield children from it."1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002, the Internet was made up of more than 600 million
users worldwide.2 There are now more than 150 countries linked
by the Internet.3 Recent studies indicate in the United States in
2002, 89.5% of children from the ages five to seventeen use com-
puters and 58.5% of them are using the Internet.4 This percent-
* Susan Hanley Kosse is an Associate Professor of Law at the Louis D. Brandeis
School of Law, University of Louisville; J.D., 1991, University of Louisville School of Law;
B.A., 1987, Miami University. The author would like to thank her colleague, Les Abram-
son, for his constant support and advice. Thanks also goes to Glenn Kosse for his editing
suggestions.
1. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002).
2. Nua, How Many Online?, at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how-manyonline/index.
html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
3. Cyberspace, Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 741 (E.D. Mich.
1999).
4. COMM. To STUDY TOOLS AND STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING KIDS FROM PORNOGRA-
PHY AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO OTHER INAPPROPRIATE INTERNET CONTENT, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET 119-20 (Dick Thornburgh
& Herbert S. Lin eds., 2002) [hereinafter NRC Report], available at http://www.nap.edu/
books/0309082749/html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
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age increases dramatically with preteens (75.6% of fourteen to
seventeen-year-olds and 65.4% of ten to thirteen-year-olds). 5 This
is an increase from 51.2% and 39.2%, respectively, in 1998.6
Benefits the Internet provides our children are obvious, yet it
has the potential to expose them to sexually explicit material. Un-
fortunately, sexually explicit or pornographic sites are on the
World Wide Web in greater and greater numbers.7 Although it
would be nearly impossible to determine accurately the number of
such sites, there is evidence that they are increasing.' According
to a recent law review article, in 1997 there were ten thousand
sites containing sexually explicit material on the Internet. 9 By
1999 this number had grown to between thirty and sixty thou-
sand sites.10 More than 100,000 pornographic websites now exist
that can be accessed for free or without providing registration in-
formation. 1
The issue for many concerned parents is how to keep children
from accessing these inappropriate sites. Unfortunately, many
sites can be found inadvertently through what would seem harm-
less searches. For example, if a child types in "sleeping beauty" or
"girls.com," not only would they retrieve some appropriate mate-
rial, but also sexually explicit material. 2 Girls.com "features
'125,000 [sic] hardcore pics' and 'Pam Anderson [and] Tommy Lee
uncensored videos.""' 3 A mistake of typing "whitehouse.com" in-
stead of "whitehouse.gov" would lead children to a site containing
pornographic material and claiming to be the number one adult
website. 1'
And our children are seeing these websites. In a study con-
ducted by the Crimes Against Children Research Center, 25% of
5. Id. at 120.
6. Id.
7. Heather L. Miller, Strike Two: An Analysis of the Child Online Protection Act's
Constitutional Failures, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 155, 159-60 (1999).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 160.
10. Id.
11. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 406 (E.D. Pa. 2002),
rev'd, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
12. Miller, supra note 7, at 161.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 163.
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the children interviewed had at least one unwanted exposure to
sexual pictures during the year prior to the survey.15 Other stud-
ies have this figure much higher, especially as the age of the child
increases. 16 For example, one study showed 45% of those aged
fourteen to seventeen had seen such a site, compared with 15% of
those aged ten to thirteen.17
With this in mind, Congress has been attempting for the last
few years to pass legislation that will protect children from inap-
propriate and harmful material found on the Internet.i" Although
that goal is commendable, it has proven difficult to achieve with-
out violating the First Amendment. 9 Activity in Congress and the
courts has been at a frantic pace on this issue. The pattern of
Congress passing legislation and then it being instantly chal-
lenged has been repeated over and over again during the past
seven years. This chart provides an overview of the legislation
passed on this issue since 1996.
15. NRC Report, supra note 4, at 132-33.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009-26 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.); Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
21, 117 Stat. 650.
19. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 248 (2002).
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Year Court ResultLaw Passed Subject Matter Challenge
Communica- 199621 Made it a crime for RENO v. Overturned24
tions Decency any person to post ACLU3
Act of 1996 material on the
("CDA")20 Internet that would
be considered inde-
cent or obscene
22
Child Pornog- 199626 Banned sexually Ashcroft v. Overturned 29
raphy Preven- explicit porno- Free Speech
tion Act of graphic images of Coalition28
1996 children that "ap-
("CPPA) 25  pears to be" or
"conveys the im-
pression" that a
minor is depicted
27
Child Online 199831 Required commer- ACLU v. Remanded to
Protection Act cial web sites to col- Ashcroft33  Third Circuit,
("COPA) 30  lect a credit card which ruled
number or other COPA was
proof of age before unconstitu-
allowing Internet tional3
users to view mate-
rial deemed harm-
ful to minors 2
20. 47 U.S.C. §§ 223, 230, 231, 609 (2000).
21. Id. § 609.
22. Id. § 223(a)(1XB)(ii).
23. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
24. Id. at 849, 885.
25. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-26
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000).
27. Id. §§ 2252A, 2256(8)(B)(D).
28. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
29. Id. at 258.
30. 47 U.S.C. §§ 223, 230, 231, 609 (2000).
31. Id. § 609.
32. Id. § 223(a), (d), (e)(5)(B).
33. 535 U.S. 564 (2002), remanded to 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003).
34. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 399
(2003). Oral arguments were heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on March 2, 2004.
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Child Internet 200036 Mandated public Am. Li- Ruled consti-
Protection Act schools and librar- brary Ass'n tutional on
("CIPA")35  ies to install filters 7 v. United June 23, 2003
States by a plural-
ity3 9
Prosecutorial 200341 Seeks to correct Passed in
Remedies and flaws of the CPPA Senate and
Other Tools to banning virtual House and
End the Ex- child pornography42  signed into
ploitation of law by Presi-
Children To- dent Bush on
day Act of April 30,
2003 (PRO- 200343
TECT Act)40
Part Two of this article examines recent federal legislation, in-
cluding the CDA and COPA, both of which tried to keep minors
from accessing harmful and inappropriate Internet material.4
Part Three of the article examines CIPA with its filtering man-
date.41 Part Four examines the laws addressing virtual child por-
nography, including the CPPA and the recently passed PROTECT
Act. Finally, Part Five of the article will be devoted to discussing
strategies to protect children, including non-legislative solutions.
II. RECENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Concerned about the volume of pornography and other inap-
propriate material available to any Internet user, including mi-
nors, Congress attempted to craft laws that would ban such ma-
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(G) (2000); 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f) (2000).
Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000); 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2000).
201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
123 S. Ct. 2297, 2309 (2003).
Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650-93 (2003).
Id.
Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 502, 117 Stat. 650, 678-80 (2003).
Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-31 (2000).
See id. § 254 (2000).
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terial.46 Both the CDA and COPA would have greatly reduced
material on the Internet that was harmful to minors, but they
proved to be too heavy of a burden on adult speech.47 Although
the statutes did serve the compelling government interest of pro-
tecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors, cer-
tain provisions were not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest
or the least restrictive means of advancing that interest.4"
A. The Communications Decency Act ("CDA")
Passed as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the
CDA prohibited Internet users from using the Internet to com-
municate material that was obscene or indecent to minors under
the age of eighteen.4 9 Specifically, § 223(a) provided:
Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications-
(B) by means of a telecommunications device know-
ingly-
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or
other communication which is obscene or indecent,
knowing that the recipient of the communication is
under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the
maker of such communication placed the call or initi-
ated the communication;
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under
his control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph
(1) with the intent that it be used for such activity,
46. See, e.g., id. § 231 (2000).
47. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 847 (1997) (finding that the CDA is unconstitu-
tional); ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that COPA is uncon-
stitutional).
48. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 874; ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 251.
49. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
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shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both.5 °
The second provision, § 223(d), prohibited the sending or dis-
playing of messages that would be deemed, under contemporary
community standards, patently offensive to a person under eight-
een years of age. It provided:
Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a spe-
cific person or persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a
manner available to a person under 18 years of age,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or
other communication that, in context, depicts or de-
scribes, in terms patently offensive as measured by con-
temporary community standards, sexual or excretory ac-
tivities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such
service placed the call or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under
such person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by
paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity,
shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both.5 1
These two provisions were limited by two affirmative defenses.
One protected individuals from liability if the person had taken
"in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions un-
der the circumstances" to keep minors from the harmful mate-
rial.12 The other covered individuals who restricted access by re-
quiring certain forms of age proof such as a verified credit card or
an adult identification number.5 3
50. Id. § 223(a).
51. Id. § 223(d).
52. Id. § 223(e)(5)(A).
53. Id. § 223(e)(5)(B).
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
B. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union
Despite these limiting defenses, the Supreme Court struck
down the statute on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad, violating the First Amendment.54 Since it
involved the First Amendment, the Court used a strict scrutiny
standard, which requires the government to show not only a com-
pelling interest for the law, but also that the law is narrowly tai-
lored and the least restrictive means to achieving the goal.55 In
striking down the CDA, the Court was troubled over undefined
key terms such as "indecent" and "patently offensive."56 The fail-
ure of Congress to define these, among other, words made the
statute unconstitutionally vague because an individual would not
have a clear understanding of what material was to be included
by those terms.57
Maybe even more troubling for the Court was the statute's
"wholly unprecedented" breadth since it was "not limited to com-
mercial speech or commercial entities," but rather "[ilts open-
ended prohibitions embrace[d] all nonprofit entities and individu-
als posting indecent messages or displaying them on their own
computers. . .,"" Although the statute would further the gov-
ernment's interest in protecting children from harmful Internet
material, the CDA would result in the suppression of legitimate
material that adults have a constitutional right to send and re-
ceive. 9 Because of this, the Court opined that the government
was required to use less restrictive means to achieve its goals of
protecting minors.6 0
Moreover, the statute was void of any guidance on which com-
munity standards in particular would be applied to determine
whether material was harmful to minors.61 Since the Internet is
available to the world, it is conceivable that a community stan-
dards criterion under this law could be interpreted to mean the
54. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
55. See id. at 870.
56. Id. at 871.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 877.
59. See id. at 874.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 873.
[Vol. 38:721
INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY
community that has the most restrictive views about what is of-
fensive.62
Finally, the defenses provided in the statute were unworkable
and "[did] not constitute the sort of 'narrow tailoring' [necessary
to save] an... unconstitutional provision."63 Although the age
verification was a legitimate option for commercial sites, the
Court found that it was not economically feasible for noncommer-
cial sites.' In addition, the Court was skeptical whether the cur-
rent technology used by the commercial pornographers actually
kept children from gaining access.65 In light of the statute's
criminal sanctions, the Court agreed with the district court that
the government had failed to prove that the defense would reduce
the heavy burden on adult speech.66
This decision was hardly a surprise, even from a conservative
court. The inclusion of websites other than commercial websites
made the law fatally flawed from the beginning.67 In addition, the
vague terms used by Congress would make it impossible for any
ordinary person to know what was and was not prohibited.6" Al-
though the intentions of the authors were good, the law could
never be seriously considered constitutional by the Court.
C. Child Online Protection Act ("COPA")
In 1998, Congress attempted to correct the problems with the
earlier CDA, and address the concerns raised by the Supreme
Court when it enacted COPA.69 Specifically, COPA prohibits an
individual or entity from: "knowingly and with knowledge of the
character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by
means of the World Wide Web, mak[ing] any communication for
62. Id. at 877-78.
63. Id. at 882.
64. Id. at 881-82.
65. Id. at 882.
66. Id.
67. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (2000).
68. See id. § 223(a), (d).
69. Id. § 231 (1998).
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commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that in-
cludes any material that is harmful to minors.""
This second attempt was noticeably narrower than the CDA in
three respects. First, COPA only applied to commercial pornogra-
phers unlike the CDA, which affected all communications.7' Sec-
ond, COPA only applied to Web communications.72 Finally, the
standard was changed from the ambiguous, indecent, and pat-
ently offensive standard to a harmful to minors standard.73
Congress also defined some of the essential key terms including
"by means of the World Wide Web," "minor," "commercial pur-
poses," and "engaged in the business."74 In addition, to clarify the
"harmful to minors" community standard criterion, Congress
adopted a slightly modified three prong test, set out first in Miller
v. California,75 which would give guidance in determining what is
actually harmful to minors. For liability to attach, it must be
proven that:
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to
minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the pru-
rient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive
with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual
contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a
lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value for minors.
76
D. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno
The day after COPA became effective, the ACLU filed suit
claiming that the statute violated the First and Fifth Amend-
70. Id. § 231(a)(1).
71. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 231(a) (1998), with 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1996).
72. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a) (1998).
73. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 231(a) (1998), with 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1996).
74. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e).
75. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
76. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6).
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ments because it was vague and infringed upon the protected
speech of adults.77 The United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania issued a preliminary injunction pre-
venting COPA's enforcement.7" The government appealed to the
Third Circuit, which affirmed the district court's order, holding
the district court properly exercised its discretion in granting the
injunction.79 Although the court did not rule on the statute's con-
stitutionality per se, its opinion gave a clear indication that this
statute also would be found to be overbroad and thus unconstitu-
tional.8" Specifically, the court concluded its opinion by stating,
"[dlue to current technological limitations, COPA-Congress'
laudatory attempt to achieve its compelling objective of protecting
minors from harmful material on the World Wide Web-is more
likely than not to be found unconstitutional as overbroad on the
merits."8 '
1. The Third Circuit Review
To determine whether the preliminary injunction was properly
granted, the Third Circuit applied a four-prong test:
"(1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of suc-
cess on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably
harmed by denial of the relief; (3) whether granting preliminary re-
lief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4)
whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public inter-
est"
82
The most important prong is whether there is a reasonable
probability that the party seeking the injunction will succeed on
the merits if the case is taken to trial.8 In analyzing this prong,
77. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1999), affd by 217 F.3d 162 (3d
Cir. 2000), rev'd sub nom. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 564 (2002), remanded to 322 F.3d
240 (3d Cir. 2003).
78. Id. at 498-99.
79. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2000), rev'd sub nom. ACLU v. Ashcroft,
535 U.S. 564 (2002), remanded to 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003).
80. Id. at 180.
81. Id. at 181.
82. Id. at 172 (quoting Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir.
1999)).
83. Id. at 173.
20041
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the Third Circuit recognized that the government did have a
compelling interest in protecting children from harmful mate-
rial. 4 This objective, however, must be met in the least restrictive
means available.8" In surmising that the statute was unconstitu-
tional, the Third Circuit focused on COPA's definition of "harmful
to minors" applying a "contemporary community standards"
clause. 6 It did so while recognizing that the district court had
identified several other grounds for declaring the statute uncon-
stitutional.8 ' For example, the district court found that the eco-
nomic costs and burdens of the age verification requirement were
too great of a burden on publishers, forcing them to stop publish-
ing or more heavily censor what they published.88 The Third Cir-
cuit acknowledged that this may be true but opined that the even
greater problem with the statute was that the Supreme Court's
concern regarding the "community standards" test in the uncon-
stitutional CDA was still not adequately remedied by this new
statute.8 9
In response, the government argued that Congress had effec-
tively dealt with this issue by including the Miller three-prong
test within the statute's text.90 The Third Circuit, however, was
not persuaded that this cured the problem since the facts in
Miller differed drastically from the current situation.9 ' Miller in-
volved the mailing of sexually explicit material that was in viola-
tion of California law.92 The publisher of the information could
control to which geographic locations the material was sent. But
because the Internet has no geographic boundaries and publish-
ers have no means of even knowing to what locale their material
goes, the Third Circuit reasoned that a community standards test
would be particularly troublesome and not appropriate.93 In es-
sence, the publisher would be forced to censor material that may
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 174 n.19.
88. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1999), vacated by 535 U.S. 564,
remanded to 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 399 (2003).
89. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d at 174.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 174-75.
92. See id. at 175.
93. See id.
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be accessed from extremely puritan communities or implement
costly age verification systems.9 4 This would effectively block ma-
terial from all minors, even if it was not deemed harmful in their
own communities.95 In addition, adults would be unconstitution-
ally deprived of their rights.96
2. The Supreme Court Weighs In
The government appealed the Third Circuit's decision; the Su-
preme Court heard the case on November 28, 2001.9' The Court
vacated the Third Circuit's opinion and remanded the case for
further proceedings. 9 The Court's plurality decision only ad-
dressed the narrow issue of whether COPA's use of the "commu-
nity standards" criteria to define what is "harmful to a minor"
made the Act unconstitutional by violating the First Amend-
ment.99 In response to that question, the Court held that "COPA's
reliance on community standards to identify 'material that is
harmful to minors' does not by itself render the statute substan-
tially overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment."' The
Court did not address, however, whether the statute was uncon-
stitutionally vague or able to survive the strict scrutiny stan-
dard.10 1
In deciding that the use of "community standards" to identify
material that is harmful to minors did not necessarily violate the
First Amendment, Justice Thomas concluded that "community
standards need not be defined by reference to a precise geo-
graphic area." 2 Instead jurors could utilize the standards from
whatever community they were familiar with and not be limited
to the standards of the "most puritan" community.0 3 Although
the Supreme Court had previously been troubled by the CDA's
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
98. Id. at 586.
99. Id. at 566.
100. Id. at 585.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 576.
103. Id. at 577.
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
use of community standards, this was not the case with COPA
because the "prurient interest" and "serious value" prongs not
found in the CDA narrowed the statute's coverage."°4 Agreeing
with Justice Thomas, Justice O'Connor noted that the respon-
dents failed to give examples of materials that would differ dra-
matically between communities given the other two prongs of the
test.
10 5
Unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Breyer argued that the legisla-
tive history illustrated that Congress meant "'community' to refer
to the Nation's adult community taken as a whole, not to geo-
graphically separate local areas."" 6 This reading would avoid al-
together the problem of "the most puritan of communities with a
heckler's Internet veto affecting the rest of the Nation."' 7
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Gins-
burg, likewise supported the remand, but only because they were
unsure that the statute was "narrow enough to render the na-
tional variation in community standards unproblematic." 08 Not-
ing that the Internet differs dramatically from regular mail or
telephones, the Justices were concerned that variations in com-
munity standards could be a particular burden for the Internet. 0 9
A decision whether this violated the First Amendment could not
be made, in their opinion, until the Third Circuit completed a
comprehensive analysis of the statute's coverage."'
Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter, voted to affirm the judg-
ment of the Third Circuit, despite the fact that COPA was better
than the CDA because it persisted in using the community stan-
dards criteria,"' which he argued will impose the most conserva-
tive communities' viewpoints on the 176.5 million Americans that
104. Id. at 578-80.
105. Id. at 586 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Despite this conclusion Justice O'Connor en-
visioned a time when overbreadth based on varying standards may exist and urged the
adoption of a national standard for obscenity to regulate the Internet. Id. at 587
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 589 (Breyer, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 593 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 599 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 603 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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have Internet access.112 As a result, certain parts of the nation
will be denied access to material that would be acceptable to
them."3 Justice Stevens did not believe that a certain community
had a right to "rid[ I not only itself, but the entire Internet, of the
offending speech." 1
4
3. Back to the Third Circuit
On remand, the Third Circuit held COPA unconstitutional be-
cause it failed the strict scrutiny test and was overbroad." 5 Al-
though the court held the statute did serve the "compelling inter-
est in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors, '  certain provisions were not narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest or the least restrictive means of advancing
that interest. 17 Specifically, the court held that the statute's defi-
nitions of prohibited harmful material, protected minors, and
regulated commercial publishers all failed to be narrowly tai-
lored. 18
The "material harmful to minors" was particularly troubling to
the court because the plain meaning of the text required evalua-
tion of a single image or "exhibit on the Internet in isolation,
rather than in context."'19 Doing so would endanger a large range
of material that otherwise would be protected because a single
image taken out of context may be classified as harmful to minors
even though it would not be when considering the work as a
whole. 2 ° In addition, the word "minor" could refer to anyone un-
der eighteen, whether that person is a three-year-old or a seven-
teen-year-old.' 2' What may have "'serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal or scientific value"' is different depending on the age of the
112. Id. at 606 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 605 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 612 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir. 2003).
116. Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 628, 639-640 (1968)).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 253. The "harmful material' definition describes such material as 'any com-
munication, picture, image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind'
that satisfies the three prongs of the 'material harmful to minors' test: prurient interest,
patently offensive, and serious value." Id. at 252 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)).
120. Id. at 253.
121. Id. at 254.
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minor."' Likewise, certain images such as a "post-pubescent fe-
male breast" would not necessarily appeal to a young child's pru-
rient interests.'23 As a result, web publishers would have insuffi-
cient guidance on what may or may not be acceptable to post on
their sites since they would not know to which specific age the
"minor" language applies.'24 Although the government tried to ar-
gue the term "minors" should be interpreted as "normal, older
adolescents," the court refused to rewrite the plain language Con-
gress had provided. 25
Similar problems existed with the phrase "communication 'for
commercial purposes. '"" '26 The phrase was not limited to commer-
cial pornographers, but instead included publishers who "have
posted any material that is 'harmful to minors' on their web sites,
even if they do not make a profit from such material itself or do
not post such material as the principal part of their business."127
Because this could potentially include non-commercial websites
that sell advertising space or publishers that have relatively
small amounts of harmful material on their sites, the court held
Congress must more narrowly define the phrase.'28
Finally, COPA's affirmative defenses would not save the stat-
ute because they actually would have the effect of unduly burden-
ing adult speech. 29 The use of credit cards or verification screens
would deter users from accessing these sites and thus affect the
economic ability of the publishers to supply such communica-
tions. 3 ° Because of this economic reality, some web publishers
may begin to self-censor and not offer communications that would
be deemed harmful to a minor yet would constitute legitimate
adult speech.' 3 ' The Third Circuit found the chilling effects of giv-
ing identifying information to access the sites was an entirely dif-
ferent burden than any technical difficulties a user may face due
122. Id. at 253-54 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(C)).
123. Id. at 254.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 256 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 256-57.
129. See id. at 260.
130. Id. at 258 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1999)).
131. Id.
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to slow response times or broken links.132 Additionally, the af-
firmative defenses did not provide publishers any assurances
against prosecution since the defense only applied after prosecu-
tion had begun.
133
In addition to failing the narrowly tailored prong of the strict
scrutiny test, COPA also failed to satisfy the least restrictive
means prong. 34 The court noted that children could still get ac-
cess to harmful material from non-commercial sites and foreign
websites.135 Minors could also obtain credit cards and view the
material.'36 Finally, less restrictive alternatives-filters, blocking
programs, and parental supervision-to achieve the government's
goals existed. 3 v
The court had similar concerns as to the breadth of the statute,
concluding that the terms "material harmful to minors," "minor,"
"commercial purposes," and "community standards" were all sig-
nificantly overinclusive, sweeping in speech clearly protected for
adults.3 ' The court refused to adopt a narrowing construction
that would make the statute constitutional, saying that "[a]ny at-
tempt to resuscitate this statute would constitute a 'serious inva-
sion of the legislative domain.""39
The Third Circuit's decision is the correct one. As unfortunate
as it is, courts should not uphold laws, even if drafted for a laud-
able purpose, that violate the Constitution.140 Although COPA is
significantly better than the CDA, it needs to be even more fine-
tuned. The broadness of the terms "material harmful to minors"
and "commercial purposes" makes them capable of being used as
a ploy to ban controversial speech on subjects such as homosexu-
132. Id. at 259.
133. Id. at 260.
134. Id. at 261.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 261-65.
138. Id. at 267-70.
139. Id. at 271 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S.
454, 479 n.26 (1995)).
140. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989);
ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 493 (E.D. Pa. 1999), vacated by 535 U.S. 564, re-
manded to 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 399 (2003).
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ality and abortion.141 The definition of "minor" is also extremely
bothersome because there is no differentiation for different aged
children. 4 2 A one-size-fits-all approach cannot be adopted to this
complex problem. If Congress meant older teenagers, then they
should have specifically indicated this. As written, COPA con-
tinues to be too vague to accomplish its commendable purpose
without wreaking havoc with the First Amendment.
III. THE CHILDREN'S INTERNET PROTECTION ACT ("CIPA") AND
ITS FILTERING MANDATE
Besides trying to remove the objectionable material altogether
or make it available to adults only, Congress tried to block it by
passing the Children's Internet Protection Act.'" This law re-
quired all libraries and schools receiving Internet subsidies to in-
stall filters. 4 ' The ACLU and the American Library Association,
among others, immediately filed a suit claiming the new law vio-
lated the First Amendment.'46 CIPA did not suffer the same fate
as the CDA and COPA and was ruled constitutional by the Su-
preme Court on June 23, 2003.'
A. Filtering Blocking-Software Bills CIPA
An alternative way to limit minors' access to harmful Internet
material is to use filtering software. Filtering software falls into
two general categories: predetermined blocking filters and rating-
based filters." The predetermined filters block speech by one of
five methods: "blacklists," "allow lists," "word-blocking," "image-
141. See Geraldine P. Rosales, Mainstream Loudoun and the Future of Internet Filter-
ing for America's Public Libraries, 26 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 357, 376 (2000).
142. See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 253-55 (discussing COPA's broad definition of
"minor").
143. See id. at 254.
144. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-335 (2000) (codified as amended in 47 U.S.C.
§ 254 and scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
145. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)-(6) (2000).
146. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev'd, 123
S.Ct. 2297 (2003).
147. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2309 (2003).
148. Junichi P. Semitsu, Note, Burning Cyberbooks in Public Libraries: Internet Filter-
ing Software vs. The First Amendment, 52 STAN. L. REV. 509, 513 (2000).
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blocking," or the blocking of entire categories. 149 Most common is
the use of blacklists, which block sites that have been predeter-
mined to be inappropriate.' A recent report testing one software
blocking product found that "thousands of unbanned porn sites"
were not properly blocked, mainly because it was too difficult for
any manufacturer to keep up with all the new material added
daily to the Internet.'5 ' In addition, many of the programs use
some form of word-blocking that often leads to the overinclusive
blocking of constitutionally protected material. 5 2 For example,
certain programs banned the word "breast," unintentionally
blocking all websites dealing with breast cancer.
153
Critics of filtering software argue that this technology can be
underinclusive as well. 5 4 Rating-based filters (PICS) are more
sophisticated, allowing individuals, webmasters, or third party
groups to rate sites by creating descriptive labels.' The PICS fil-
ters "read the labels and use their own filtering criteria to decide
whether to block the site."5 ' The design of the technology makes
it much easier to individually tailor what will and will not be
blocked based on the policies and concerns of the library or school
using the filter.'57 Ideally, each community library could create
their own criteria for blocking sites. Realistically, however, this
can be too burdensome for the libraries, forcing them to adopt cri-
teria designed by third-party organizations. 15 This, the critics ar-
gue, will result in these third-party organizations' subjective
value judgments being implemented by the libraries."'
Despite the debate over the technology, legislation requiring
schools and libraries with Internet access to install blocking soft-
ware on their computers has been on the legislative agenda for
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 515-16 (quoting The Censorware Project, Passing Porn, Banning the Bible:
NZHZ's Bess in Public Schools, at http://censorware.net/reports/bess (last visited Mar. 30,
2004)).
152. Id. at 514.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 515.
155. Id. at 517.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 518.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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several years. The first proposed act to address the issue was the
Internet School Filtering Act.16° Senator John S. McCain (R-Az.)
introduced the bill to the Senate on February 9, 1998,161 while
Representative Bob Franks (R-N.J.) introduced House Bill 3177
on February 11, 1998.162 Both bills proposed amending 47 U.S.C.
§ 254 to require elementary and secondary schools and libraries
receiving federal Internet access subsidies to install blocking
software." Specifically, the legislation provided that "[n]o ser-
vices may be provided.., to any elementary or secondary school,
or any library, unless it provides the certification... that it
has... selected a system for computers with Internet access to
filter or block matter deemed to be inappropriate for minors."164
The Senate version of the bill was referred to the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and hearings were
held. 165 On June 25, 1998 Senator McCain reported to the Senate,
and the bill was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar. 166 The
bill was attached to the 1999 Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and related agencies Appropriations Act on July 21,
1998, and passed by the Senate on July 23, 1998.167 House Bill
3177 was referred to the House Commerce Committee,168 but was
not acted upon.
Not to be discouraged, in January 1999, Senators John S.
McCain and Ernest F. "Fritz" Hollings tried again. This time they
introduced the Children's Internet Protection Act.169 This bill was
then reintroduced by McCain as Amendment 3610 to the Labor,
Health and Human Services Appropriations Bill (House Bill
160. S. 1619, 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1998).
161. See 144 CONG. REC. 1054 (1998).
162. See id. at 1280.
163. See id. at 1055.
164. Id.
165. See S. REP. No. 105-226, at 7-8 (1998).
166. See S. REP. NO. 105-226 (1998).
167. The Internet School Filtering Act was attached to the Appropriations Act as
Amendment 3228. See 144 CONG. REC. 58610, S8614 (daily ed. July 21, 1998). The Appro-
priations Act, as amended, was approved by the Senate. See 144 CONG. REC. 58880 (daily
ed. July 23, 1998).
168. See 144 CONG. REC. 1280 (1998).
169. See 145 CONG. REC. S340 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999).
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4577)17 This amendment was approved by a vote of 95-3 on June
29, 2000.171
The House passed a similar, but not identical, bill on June 8,
2000. The legislation was referred to a conference committee to
reconcile the House and Senate versions. 172 The reconciled version
became an amendment to the Department of Health and Human
Services Appropriations Bill, which was passed by Congress on
Friday, December 15, 2000,17' and was signed by President Clin-
ton on December 21, 2000.174
The American Library Association (ALA) and free speech
groups fiercely opposed the bill. The ALA website had multiple
entries urging its members to lodge their disapproval with their
elected representatives. The ALA advised their members that:
[F]ederal filtering mandates are not the answer to [the] very complex
question [of objectionable Internet material] because:
" Federal filtering mandates are unfunded mandates. They
will require [the local] library to take on the onerous burden
of paying to install and maintain filters or be stripped of key
federal funding.
" Federal mandates trample on the decision making responsi-
bilities and capabilities of [the] local library board. Man-
dates do not allow [local library boards] to articulate...
community [-specific] values because they force [local library
boards] to turn over ... community decisions to corporate
entities.
* Federal filtering mandates are a one-size-fits-all, overly
broad solution to a complex and local problem. Around 95%
of public libraries already have in place a formal policy to
regulate use of the Internet. But the Labor-HHS-Ed
170. See 146 CONG. REC. S5707-09 (daily ed. June 22, 2000).
171. See 146 CONG. REC. S5869 (daily ed. June 27, 2000).
172. See 146 CONG. REC. H6561 (daily ed. July 19, 2000). For the conference report on
the bill, see 146 CONG. REC. H12100 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000).
173. See 146 CONG. REC. S11885 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000) for the Senate's agreement to
the conference report and 146 CONG. REc. H12502 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000) for the House
of Representatives' agreement to the report.
174. See Children's Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-335
(2000) (codified as amended in 47 U.S.C. § 254 and scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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amendments prescribe broad, unfunded federal government
control in [the local] library.
Federal mandates will have the most profound effect on
those libraries which most need E-rate discounts and other
funding. Low-income, poverty-stricken libraries will not
have the resources to implement filtering and comply with
the certification requirement.
175
The New York Times published an editorial urging Congress
not to pass the amendment. 176 The writer called federally man-
dated filters "absurd" and most likely "unconstitutional." 17 7 Be-
cause filtering software is oftentimes ineffective, the author urged
that monitoring students more closely was a better solution.
78
In contrast, parent groups praised Senator McCain's relentless
efforts to protect children from the negative aspects of the Inter-
net. The American Family Association strongly supported the
Bill, stating it would "provide a very effective solution to the
growing problem of pornography accessible on the Internet by
computers in schools and public libraries.
Before the bill was even signed into law, the ACLU announced
its plans to sue.' Chris Hansen, a lawyer for the ACLU, called
the filtering requirement "a mandated censorship system by the
federal government."' 8 ' Mr. Hansen took particular offense over
the bill's supporters' view that even though filters have multiple
problems, filters still were better than having nothing at all. Han-
sen stated that "It]he First Amendment doesn't have a 'good
enough' requirement .... Suppose we said it would be better
than nothing for someone to go into Barnes and Noble and burn
175. AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, FEDERAL FILTERING MANDATES, at http://www.ala.org/
cfapps/archive.cfm?path=washoff/filteringmandate.html (last visited Mar 30, 2004).
176. A Misguided Pornography Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, at WK 14.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Senate Approves Amendment Requiring Filters for Web Surfing in Libraries,
Schools, 69 U.S.L.W. 2028 (July 11, 2000).
180. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Promises Legal Challenge
as Congress Adopts Bill Imposing Internet Blocking in Libraries (Dec. 18, 2000), available
at http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=8219&c=252.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2004).
181. D. Ian Hopper, Associated Press, ACLU Fighting Internet Filtering (Dec. 19,
2000), available at http://www.apfn.net/messageboard/12-27-00/mbs.cgi.3560.html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2004).
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every tenth book. That sort of casual insensitivity to censorship is
disturbing."1
82
B. Prior Lawsuits over Filtering Laws
A lawsuit over the constitutionality of filters is nothing new. In
fact, lawsuits have been filed testing the First Amendment's limi-
tations on the use of Internet filtering in public libraries. In 1997,
ten individual plaintiffs, all adult patrons of their local library,
brought suit to enjoin the library from installing filtering soft-
ware on the library's computers.13 Earlier that year the library
board had voted to adopt a policy on Internet sexual harass-
ment.1" The policy required that .' [s]ite-blocking software... be
installed on all [library] computers' so as to: 'a. block child por-
nography and obscene material (hard core pornography)'; and 'b.
block material deemed Harmful to Juveniles under applicable
Virginia statutes and legal precedents (soft core pornography).' 1 85
The commercial product "X-Stop" was chosen to limit access to
sites that violated the library policy.
86
The plaintiffs alleged a violation of their freedom of speech.8 7
Specifically, they argued that the policy impermissibly blocked
their access to protected speech and chilled their receipt of consti-
tutionally protected materials.' For instance, they could no
longer gain access to the Quaker homepage, the Zero Population
Growth website, and the site for the American Association of Uni-
versity Women-Maryland because these sites had been
blocked."8 9 Moreover, they claimed there were no clear criteria for
determining which sites would be blocked. 9 °
182. Id.
183. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. (Mainstream Loudoun I), 2 F. Supp. 2d 783
(E.D. Va. 1998).
184. Id. at 787.
185. Id. (quoting the Library Board's Policy on Internet Sexual Harassment).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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Since the libraries at issue were determined to be limited pub-
lic forums, any content-based restriction had to be "'narrowly
drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest."""' The court ac-
cepted the defendant's assertion that protecting minors from
harmful Internet material and avoiding a sexually hostile envi-
ronment were compelling government objectives.' 92 But because
the filtering policy was too broad-it was not limited to minors
and there were not adequate standards for restricting speech-
the policy was not the least restrictive means or reasonably nec-
essary to achieve the government's goals. 93 The court noted that
less restrictive options were available, including library staff
monitoring, filters for minors only, and privacy screens. 194
Just the threat of lawsuits has made some libraries change
their plans to install filters.19 For example, on August 16, 2000,
the Nashua Public Library Board of Trustees in Nashua, New
Hampshire, voted to reverse their decision to install Surfwatch
software on all their computers.' 96 This reversal came after local
citizens opposed to the policy contacted the People for the Ameri-
can Way Foundation and some New England attorneys. 9 Like-
wise, the public libraries of Kern County, California changed
their policy of requiring filters on their computers when the
ACLU threatened legal action.
98
Conversely, there has also been unsuccessful litigation for a li-
brary's failure to restrict children's access to harmful Internet
material. It is not surprising that many libraries choose not to
utilize filters, considering the American Library Association's po-
sition that any efforts to block access violate the Library Bill of
191. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. (Mainstream Loudoun II), 24 F. Supp. 2d 552,
562 (E.D. Va. 1998) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 46 (1983)).
192. Id. at 565.
193. See id. at 567-68 (analyzing the constitutionality of the library's Internet restric-
tion policy).
194. Id. at 567.
195. B.A. Robinson, Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, A Sampling of Inter-
net Censorship Activities in Various Locations, at http//www.religioustolerance.orgcyber
pat2.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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Rights. 199 Perhaps the most publicized suit filed concerning this
matter was Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore. °° In this case, a
mother filed suit hoping to force her local library to install fil-
ters.20 ' The impetus for the legal battle came after her 12-year-old
son downloaded pornographic pictures off the library's com-
puter.2 °2 The case was dismissed in January 1999 in a one-
sentence ruling.2 °3
This issue has not been limited to just public libraries. In Palm
Beach, Florida in 1998, a mother sued the Broward County
School Board for, among other things, failing to install filters on
public school computers. 2 4 The case was settled on December 16,
1998.205
C. The CIPA Challenge-American Library Association v. United
States
True to their promise, the American Library Association and
the ACLU, along with library patrons and website publishers,
filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of CIPA on March
20, 2001, in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania. 20 6 On May 31, 2002, the three-judge court
199. Karen G. Schneider, Public Library Ass'n, Plain Facts About Internet Filtering
Software, Tech. Notes, at http://www.ala.orglala/pla/plapubs/technotes/internetfiltering.
htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
200. Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, No. V-015266-4 (Cal. App. Pep't Super. Ct.
1998). As no opinion was written at the Superior Court level, see Kathleen R. v. City of
Livermore, TECH. L.J. at http://www.techlawjournal.com/courts/Kathleenr/Default.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2004), for a summary of the trial court proceedings.
201. Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
202. Id. at 775.
203. See Judge Dismisses Livermore Library Filtering Suite, TECH. L.J., at http://www.
techlawjournal.com/censor/19990115.htm (Jan. 15, 1999). Judge George Hernandez dis-
missed the suit, writing "[tihe Demurrer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint for In-
junctive Relief is sustained and the First Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief is dis-
missed without leave to amend." Id.
204. Hoffman v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, No. 98-6290-CIV-HURLEY (S.D. Fla.
1999); see Second Amended Complaint at para. 28, Hoffman (No. 98-6290-C1V-HURLEY),
available at http://www.gocin.com/ramp/brwschool/lawsuit2.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2004).
205. Settlement Agreement, Hoffman (No. 98-6290-CIV-HURLEY), available at http://
www.gocin.com/ramp/brwschool/settlement.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
206. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev'd, 123
S.Ct. 2297 (2003).
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unanimously found for the plaintiffs. °7 The court relied heavily
on an extensive factual record that established filtering products
were not effective because of their underinclusive and/or overin-
clusive nature which blocks constitutionally protected speech.208
As a result, the court concluded the mandatory use of filters was
not narrowly tailored to further the government's interest and
less restrictive alternatives existed.20 9 The government's argu-
ment that the unblocking features of the programs cured any de-
fects did not persuade the court because having to ask a librarian
to unblock a site would have a chilling effect on patrons' speech.210
The court acknowledged several reasons why filters are ineffec-
tive at keeping harmful material away from minors.211 First, "no
category definition used by filtering software companies is identi-
cal to CIPA's definitions of visual depictions that are obscene,
child pornography, or harmful to minors."212 Automated classifi-
cation systems thus are subject to overblocking and underblock-
ing.213 In addition, these systems can only search text, not im-
ages.2"4 Even if human review is possible, the approximately 1.5
million pages added to the Web each day make it impossible for
companies to realistically and accurately categorize pages be-
cause of limited staff and human error and misjudgment.2" The
addition of new pages to a website after it has been originally
categorized only exacerbates the problem.2"6
Considering these limitations with filters, the court suggested
the existence of less restrictive methods for accomplishing the
government's goals.21 7 For example, libraries could adopt Internet
use policies and punish violators.218 In addition, the libraries
could use a "tap-on-the-shoulder" method to discourage minors
207. Id. at 495-96.
208. Id. at 408.
209. Id. at 410.
210. Id. at 486-87.
211. Id. at 429.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 430-31. The court spent a major portion of its opinion giving examples of
erroneously blocked websites. Id. at 446-47.
214. Id. at 431.
215. Id. at 433.
216. See id. at 435.
217. Id. at 480-84.
218. Id. at 480.
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from viewing harmful content.219 Privacy screens and terminals
outside of patrons' sight lines also are less restrictive methods as
compared to filters.22 °
Finally, the court held that CIPA's disabling provisions failed
to cure the defects.221 The court surmised that patrons would be
reluctant to ask librarians to unblock sites containing sensitive
information.222 Moreover, many of these sites may take several
days to be unblocked and the delay would place a significant bur-
den on a patron's use of the Internet.223
The government appealed the decision, and the Supreme Court
of the United States heard arguments on March 5, 2003.224
D. Will CIPA Be Constitutional?
The parties, commentators, and scholars were split on whether
Congress had finally drafted a bill regulating the Internet that
would adhere to the Constitution.225 Some surmised that the Su-
preme Court's decision would most likely depend on whether the
Court believed the law was a permissible exercise of Congress'
spending power or a regulation chilling protected speech.226 Along
these lines proponents of the law were hopeful that the Court
might determine "that government funding of public libraries
does not create a forum in which it has an obligation to subsidize
the exercise of First Amendment rights."227 They argued that li-
braries and the Internet should be classified as nonpublic forums,
and the legality of any restrictions should be reviewed using a
reasonable basis standard.22 Others argued that the Court
should use a strict scrutiny analysis and find these restrictions to
219. Id. at 482.
220. Id. at 483-84.
221. Id. at 489.
222. Id. at 486.
223. Id. at 487.
224. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
225. See Steven D. Hinckley, Your Money or Your Speech: The Children's Internet Pro-
tection Act and the Congressional Assault on the First Amendment in Public Libraries, 80
WASH. U. L.Q. 1025, 1097-99 (2002) (arguing CIPA is unconstitutional).
226. Id. at 1059.
227. Id. at 1079.
228. Id. at 1086-91.
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be a prior restraint.229 Finally, some thought the Court may find
the government's argument persuasive that Internet filtering is
analogous to a library's acquisition of books.2 3' Each of these ar-
guments will be explored in more detail below.
E. Are Filters a Permissible Exercise of Congress' Spending
Power?
When passing CIPA, Congress obviously relied on their grow-
ing trend to regulate this nation through the power of the purse.
In recent years legislation placing restrictions on recipients of
federal funds has increased.23' Some view this phenomena skepti-
cally, asserting that this is:
one of the primary tools Congress uses to control the activities of
prospective funding recipients in ways that conform to its vision of
contemporary federal policy because this frequently avoids many of
the troublesome constitutional barriers that would make such con-
trol problematic, if not impossible, if they were attempted as direct
statutory mandates.
232
Although the courts have given Congress much more latitude
with funding legislation that imposes restrictions than they may
have with other laws, restrictions do exist on Congress' spending
power.233 These limits include using the spending power for the
"'general welfare' 234 of the United States and "'unambiguously' 235
describing the funding conditions that must relate "'to the federal
interest in particular national projects or programs. ' '236 In addi
tion, no excessive coercion is permissible, and "'other constitu-
tional provisions may provide an independent bar to the condi-
tional grant of federal funds.' 237
229. Id. at 1091-97.
230. Gregory K Laughlin, Sex, Lies, and Library Cards: The First Amendment Implica-
tions of the Use of Software Filters To Control Access to Internet Pornography in Public Li-
braries, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 213, 259-63 (2003).
231. See Hinckley, supra note 201, at 1060.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1061-64 (discussing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).
234. Id. at 1062 (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 207).
235. Id. at 1063 (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 207).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1063 (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 208).
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Professor Hinckley, Associate Dean for Library and Informa-
tion Technology and Professor of Law at the University of South
Carolina School of Law, thoroughly traces the Court's decisions
regarding conditional funding in the First Amendment context.238
Ultimately he concludes that the Court can take two approaches
when faced with this issue. One approach is to adopt the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine to overturn the legislation when
the condition is so coercive the recipient has no choice but to
forego constitutionally protected activity.239 The other approach is
for the Court to classify the restriction as a mere subsidy which
does not prohibit the individual from engaging in the activity on
her own time or with her own money.24 ° Hinckley notes that of-
tentimes the choice between the two approaches is result
driven.24' CIPA's survival will depend on which analytical scheme
the court adopts.
The ACLU, of course, argued that the Court should adopt the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and overturn the statute.242
Relying on the holding in Legal Services Corp. v. Velasquez243 that
prohibited Congress from imposing restrictions which distort the
traditional function of the medium, the ACLU urged the Court to
find that filters distort "'the usual functioning of public libraries
as places of freewheeling inquiry. "'2
The government countered the ACLU position by arguing gov-
ernment entities, such as libraries, do not have Constitutional
rights.245 Moreover, since the federal aid goes to the libraries and
not the patron, the appellees cannot argue that CIPA imposes an
unconstitutional condition on the patron's First Amendment
rights.246 Even if the library would have some unconstitutional
238. Id. at 1065-72.
239. Id. at 1070.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1070-71.
242. Brief for Appellees at 45-48, United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297
(2003) (No. 02-361) (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533, 534, 536, 544-45
(2001)).
243. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
244. Brief for Appellees, supra note 218, at 48 (quoting Jurisdictional Statement app.
187a, n.36, United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
245. Brief for Appellants at 40, United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297
(2003) (No. 02-361).
246. Id. at 41.
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conditions claim, the claim would lack merit because libraries
have traditionally excluded pornography from their collections
and CIPA does not prohibit the recipient of federal aid from "'en-
gaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally
[assisted] program.' 247 In addition, the restrictions will not dis-
tort the usual functioning of a library because "[p]roviding pa-
trons with illegal or harmful pornography is not 'inherent' in the
role of public libraries in our society."248
F. Is Internet Access at Libraries Similar to Traditional Public
Forums?
How Internet access at libraries is classified is very important
because the classification will dictate the level of scrutiny the
court uses to analyze the law.249 Traditional and limited public fo-
rums are analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard, whereas non-
public forums must survive a rational basis review.2 50
The appellees in American Library Ass'n classified libraries not
as limited public forums, but as true traditional public forums,
2 1
because libraries allow all members of the public to enter and
"provide broad access to a wide range of speakers when they offer
Internet access."252  Such Internet service has a "'speech-
facilitating character,"' much like a sidewalk or public park, that
makes it "'distinctly deserving of First Amendment protection.'
253
The government noted in its brief that the Supreme Court has
never "decided what level of scrutiny applies to a public library's
content-based judgments regarding the material it makes avail-
able to its patrons." 2 4 The government argued that neither forum
analysis nor strict scrutiny applied because "the Court ha[d]
made clear that the government has broad discretion to make
247. Id. at 41 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991)).
248. Id. at 44 (quoting Velasquez, 531 U.S. at 543).
249. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985).
250. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
251. Brief for Appellees, supra note 218, at 24-27.
252. Id. at 25.
253. Id. at 24 (quoting Jurisdictional Statement app. 129a, United States v. Am. Li-
brary Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003)).
254. Brief for Appellants, supra note 221, at 20.
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content-based judgments in deciding what private speech to make
available to the public."25" Libraries, not courts, must have broad
discretion to make content-based decisions in fulfilling their mis-
sion to facilitate worthwhile and appropriate research, learning,
and recreational reading and pursuits.256 Therefore, the govern-
ment contended that neither forum analysis nor strict scrutiny
applied to a public library's collection decisions, but a rational ba-
sis review should apply instead. 7
The government argued that such restrictions are reasonable,
because even if the filters erroneously block some protected
speech, this material can be found on other websites.258 Alterna-
tively, the government argued that filters satisfy even the strict
scrutiny standard because the government has a compelling in-
terest in protecting children, and the filters are the least restric-
tive means to accomplish this goal.259
G. Does CIPA Impose a Prior Restraint on Speech?
Prior restraints on speech are presumptively invalid.260 How-
ever, the government in American Library Ass'n argued that the
use of filters by a library is not a prior restraint because "[any
material blocked by a filter remains on the Internet and may be
obtained from millions of computers throughout the world."261 The
library classified the "decision not to provide such material
through its own computers" as a "collection decision, not a re-
straint on private speech."
26 2
255. Id.
256. Id. at 22.
257. Id. at 11, 32. The appellants rely on National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
524 U.S. 569, 585-86 (1998), and Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998), to support their argument. These cases held that broad dis-
cretion must be given to the National Endowment for the Arts and public television sta-
tions to fulfill their mission. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 585-86; Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673.
258. Brief for Appellants, supra note 221, at 35.
259. Id. at 39.
260. Brief for Appellees, supra note 218, at 43-44 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sulli-
van, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
261. Brief for Appellants, supra note 221, at 45.
262. Id.
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In contrast, plaintiffs argued that CIPA "block[s] speech that is
not even close to the line between protected and unprotected
speech" and therefore CIPA is unconstitutional.263 Filtering pro-
grams imposed by libraries function as "automated censors" that
block, with no prior judicial review, websites containing protected
speech.264 The ACLU would not accept the government's argu-
ment that the use of filters is not a prior restraint because it is
much like the "library's decision not to [order] Playboy."26 The
ACLU, however, distinguished local book selection and a federal
mandate for participation in a much-needed funding program.266
Particularly, CIPA cuts the librarians out of the selection process
altogether and gives that discretion to third-party, non-
governmental actors.267
H. Is Filtering Analogous to a Library's Acquisition of Books?
The government's argument was essentially that the CIPA fil-
tering requirement is really no different than a library deciding
which books to include in their collection.26" Libraries cannot
choose to carry every book or even multiple copies of every
book.269 As a result, a library has to make discretionary judg-
ments about what to purchase with its finite resources.2 ° In
much the same way, the filtering programs exclude certain parts
of the Internet-i.e., pornography-which libraries may not want
to offer to their patrons.27'
In response to the government's print and Internet collection
comparison, the ACLU challenged this argument on six grounds:
(1) CIPA actually takes away a library's discretion because it
mandates libraries nationwide to utilize filters even if they have
decided against such a policy; 272 (2) Fundamental differences exist
263. Brief for Appellees, supra note 218, at 43.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 44.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Brief for Appellants, supra note 221, at 11.
269. See id. at 18.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 11, 18, 22-23.
272. Brief for Appellees, supra note 218, at 39.
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between filters and book selection because book selection involves
review, unlike the blocked websites that have never been re-
viewed;273 (3) Filters are not like third-party vendors or book re-
views because they censor, rather than select, material that will
be added to the collection;2 4 (4) No credible reason exists that
prohibits subjecting book collection to rational basis review and
Internet access to strict scrutiny;25 (5) Filters "'would risk trans-
forming the role of public libraries in our society;"'276 and (6) The
government's argument that the blocked sites are reasonable be-
cause patrons can get information from other sites is a "twisted
rewriting of the First Amendment."
277
I. The Supreme Court Decision
The government appealed the lower court decision, and the Su-
preme Court of the United States heard arguments on March 5,
2003.278 On June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court, in a plurality deci-
sion with three separate opinions, upheld CIPA.279 Six Justices
ruled that the filter law conditioning library subsidies on Internet
filter use did not exceed Congress's spending clause power, vio-
late the library patron's First Amendment rights, or impose un-
constitutional conditions on the libraries' receipt of federal aid.28 °
In reversing the district court's decision that the law unconstitu-
tionally imposed a content-based restriction on access to a public
forum because it was not narrowly tailored to meet the govern-
ment's compelling interest, the Court refused to utilize the public
forum principles for this case.28'
Determining that the public forum principles were "out of
place" for this case, Chief Justice Rehnquist refused to find Inter-
net access in a public library a public forum because historically
273. Id. at 39-40.
274. Id. at 40-41.
275. Id. at 41.
276. Id. (quoting Brief for Appellants, supra note 221, at 19).
277. Id. at 41-42.
278. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
279. Id.
280. Federal Law Conditioning Library Subsidies on Internet Filter Use is Ruled Con-
stitutional, 71 U.S.L.W. 1791, 1791 (June 24, 2003).
281. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2303-04.
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it was not designated as such, and its purpose was not to encour-
282age a diversity of views like traditional public forums. Rather, a
library provides Internet access only to aid its patrons with their
research and information collection. 2 3 The opinion analogized the
public libraries' discretionary judgment about what to make
available to patrons to the National Endowment for the Arts'
("NEA") content-based criteria in making funding decisions and a
public television station's editorial judgment regarding what its
viewers see.284 In both of those prior contexts, the Court refused
to become involved in discretionary judgments which necessarily
had to be made by the entities themselves.2 5
The Court found the libraries' argument-that they enjoy less
discretion with the Internet compared to book selection because
each book is affirmatively chosen to be acquired-of no constitu-
tional significance. 286 A library's decision to exclude pornography
from its print collection was not subject to strict scrutiny, so nei-
ther should its decision to block similar material online.28 7 Fur-
thermore, due to the ever-changing nature of the Internet, it
would be unrealistic to expect a library to review every web
page.28 Likewise, the filters' "overblocking" tendencies were not
fatal because it was relatively easy for a patron to ask for the site
to be unblocked.28 9
Having dismissed the public forum analysis, the Court next re-
jected the libraries' argument that CIPA somehow "impose[d] an
unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal assistance."2 9°
Refusing to answer whether the government had First Amend-
ment rights at all, the Court held the question was irrelevant be-
cause the "unconstitutional conditions" claim failed on its mer-
its.291 Relying on its previous decision in Rust v. Sullivan,292 the
282. Id. at 2304-05.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 2304.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 2306.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 2307.
291. Id.
292. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
[Vol. 38:721
INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY
Court concluded that Congress, in passing the E-rate and LSTA
programs, was not denying a benefit to anyone but merely insist-
ing that these "'public funds be spent for the purposes for which
they were authorized.' 293 Since libraries are still free to offer un-
filtered access and forego the federal assistance, there is no pen-
alty on that activity.294
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy failed to see any issue in
the case since an adult patron could ask for any blocked site to be
disabled.295 However, he did acknowledge that there may be "an
as-applied challenge" if a library did not have the capacity to un-
block the sites or the user's access is burdened in some way.296
Justice Breyer, although not requiring strict scrutiny, proposed
some heightened scrutiny rather than rational basis review when
examining the statute.297 In his opinion, the Court should ask
"whether the harm to speech-related interests is disproportionate
in light of both the justifications and the potential alterna-
tives."29 Taking CIPA through this heightened, yet not strict
scrutiny analysis, he was satisfied that the statute was constitu-
tional because the government has a compelling interest and
there was presently no better solution or alternative.299 Although
he acknowledged the patron may be burdened when asking for a
site to be unblocked, Justice Breyer refused to recognize that
burden as outweighing the government's interest in protecting
children from pornographic materials."'
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent focusing on the filters'
acknowledged flaws of "underblocking" and "overblocking" and
the variety of alternative, less restrictive methods available.0 1 He
293. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2308 (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 196). In Rust,
Congress placed limits on federal funds used for family planning purposes by prohibiting
the funds for any programs that included abortion counseling. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178-81.
The Supreme Court upheld the restriction, holding that the restriction did not deny a
benefit to anyone but was necessary to make sure the funds were being spent for the pur-
poses for which they were authorized. Id. at 196.
294. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2308.
295. Id. at 2309 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
296. Id. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
297. Id. at 2310-11 (Breyer, J., concurring).
298. Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
299. Id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring).
300. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
301. Id. at 2312-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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refused to find the statute cured by the provision allowing for pa-
trons to ask for sites to be unblocked, because a patron may have
no knowledge of those sites.30 2 He also feared that the libraries'
various procedures regarding unblocking would lead to a prior re-
straint on adult access to protected speech.0 3
In addition, Justice Stevens took issue with the plurality's find-
ing that the statute does not impose an unconstitutional condition
on public libraries.0 4 He argued that the plurality improperly re-
lied on Rust v. Sullivan because that case only applies to situa-
tions of government speech.30 5 The federal assistance under the E-
Rate and LSTA programs was designed to give Internet access to
low-income individuals, not to promote or convey any specific
government speech.30 ' Furthermore, even if there was a message
of no pornography, the filtering devices would not promote this
message because of their flaws of "underblocking" and "overblock-
ing. "307
Justice Souter, with Justice Ginsburg joining, wrote another
dissent adding that if the libraries had placed filters on the com-
puters on their own, they would have violated the First Amend-
ment.308 Specifically, the Justices were gravely concerned with the
permissive statutory language of "may," when referring to the
granting of an adult's request to unblock a site.309 Even more ob-
jectionable is the discretion given the librarian who only needs to
unblock the site for "'bona fide research or other lawful pur-
poses."'3 10 As a result, adults will be blocked from a substantial
amount of protected material.31" ' A library cannot do that because
blocking protected speech is censorship, not discretionary selec-
tion of materials as described by the plurality.3 2 Justices Souter
and Ginsburg felt the plurality's comparison to the discretionary
302. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
303. Id. at 2315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
304. Id. at 2316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 2317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
306. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
307. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 2318 (Souter, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting).
310. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (2000)).
311. Id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 2320-21 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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selection of books was flawed because the reasons for the discre-
tion-scarcity of resources and space-are not present with the
Internet.313 Moreover, since it is a longstanding policy that a li-
brary not deny any adult patron access to a book in its collection,
the plurality's characterization of the library's mission to deny
adults access to certain books was misplaced.314 Finally, Justice
Souter and Justice Ginsburg compared site blocking to removing
library materials from the shelves and were comfortable with the
courts reviewing such decisions." 5
The Supreme Court incorrectly decided this case. As Professor
Hinckley predicted, the Court justified its decision by fantasizing
that somehow blocking websites was not a penalty, since the li-
braries could choose to give patrons unfiltered access and forego
the funding. 6 However, this is hardly a choice at all. With budg-
ets for all governmental entities shrinking, it is safe to assume
that these subsidies are a huge part of libraries' technology budg-
ets. The choice for the libraries then is to install the filters and
get the subsidies, or have no Internet service at all. Being unable
to provide Internet service to aid patrons with their research and
informational pursuits, especially their lowest income patrons,
flies in the face of a library's very mission.
The plurality's position is even less defensible in light of the
uncontradicted evidence that the filters just do not work because
of the under-inclusive and over-inclusive nature of the present
technology. 7 To mandate filters is absurd and shortsighted when
there are less restrictive methods available for meeting the gov-
ernment's compelling and laudable goal of protecting children
from pornography. Equally discouraging is the plurality's glossing
over the chilling effect these filters will have. Justice Stevens
rightfully points out that many patrons will not request any un-
blocking because they will not be aware of what sites should be
unblocked.1 Also, why should the request be limited to "bona
313. Id. at 2321 (Souter, J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 2322-24 (Souter, J., dissenting).
315. Id. at 2324 (Souter, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 2308.
317. See id. at 2306.
318. Id. at 2315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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fide research" purposes?319 Is there a problem with just wanting
access to the material for enjoyment purposes? Finally, the plu-
rality's analogy with print pornographic materials being excluded
because they are deemed inappropriate is weak.32 ° Without look-
ing at each website, how will a librarian know if it contains mate-
rial that is truly inappropriate, and therefore, would not be in-
cluded in the library's collection if it were in print?
Unfortunately, a librarian will not know-thus the only result
will be that protected speech will be censored from adults unnec-
essarily, and speech that is harmful to neither adults nor minors
will be blocked.321 Justice Stevens summed this up best when he
stated, "[iun my judgment, a statutory blunderbuss that mandates
this vast amount of 'overblocking' abridges the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment."
3 22
Any critics of the opinion who would like to see it overturned
may not have long to wait, because Justice Kennedy's opinion
foreshadowed the next constitutional challenge to the statute.323
Although agreeing that on its face CIPA was valid, he left open
an "as-applied" challenge if libraries do not have the capacity to
disable the filters readily or if the adult patron's viewing of con-
stitutionally protected material is burdened in some other way.324
This appears likely, since the statute does not make unblocking
mandatory and leaves a great deal of discretion to the librarian
whether to unblock the site or not.325 Both Justices Kennedy and
Breyer upheld the statute based on an adult patron's right to
have the site unblocked.326 If it becomes evident that this is not
occurring in practice, the Court, counting Justices Kennedy and
Breyer as the swing votes, may revisit the statute, declaring it
unconstitutional.
Perhaps the greatest irony of the government's arguments and
the Supreme Court's decision is that they are both largely prem-
ised on the library's discretionary judgment to decide what to in-
319. Id. at 2302 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (2000)).
320. Id. at 2306.
321. See id. at 2313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
322. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 2309-10 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
324. Id. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
325. See 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 254 (h)(6)(D) (2000).
326. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2309-12 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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clude in its collection. Specifically, since a library's decision not to
include pornography in its collection is not subject to strict scru-
tiny neither should its decision to block similar material online.
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the use of a filtering system
is a collection decision not a prior restraint on speech. 27 Yet it is
not the libraries' decision to block the online material. In fact, the
libraries vehemently oppose filters, and on July 25, 2003, the
American Library Association issued a press release that reiter-
ated its commitment to continue to educate the public about the
negative impacts of CIPA and to continue to seek and protect the
First Amendment rights of library users.328 If libraries in a spe-
cific community decide filters are the best way to address the
pornography problem, then the Court's analysis may be correct.
However, this has not yet been the situation. Congress is the body
blocking the online material (making the collection decision), not
the libraries, so the analogy that the Court uses is misplaced.
IV. ADDITIONAL LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY: THE CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT (CPPA) AND THE PROTECT ACT
Addressing a separate but related problem, Congress passed
the CPPA in 1996 to prohibit "virtual" child pornography.3 29 Ad-
vances in technology have made it possible for individuals to pro-
duce computer-generated images of children engaged in sexually
explicit conduct. Often these images are impossible to distinguish
from real children. Supporters of the law argued it was necessary
to prevent the abuse of children. Although once again the drafters
had a commendable objective, the law's vagueness and over-
breadth resulted in it being overturned by the Supreme Court.33 °
In April 2003, Congress tried again with the Prosecutorial Reme-
dies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today
327. Id. at 2307 n.4.
328. Press Release, Am. Library Ass'n, CIPA Decision Response: A Statement from
ALA President Carla D. Hayden and the ALA Executive Board (July 25, 2003) available at
http://www.ala.org/PrinterTemplate.cfin?%20=News&template--/ContentManagementlCon
tentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=39847 (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
329. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000).
330. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002).
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Act of 2003 ("PROTECT Act"), 31 which is sure to be immediately
challenged.
A. The Child Pornography Prevention Act ("CPPA")
Congress has also tried to regulate "virtual" child pornography
with the same outcome to date as with all other Internet laws.332
In 1996, Congress passed the CPPA-banning the knowing re-
production, distribution, sale, reception, or possession of any vis-
ual depiction of what "appears to be... a minor" or "conveys the
impression... of a minor engaging in sexually explicit con-
duct."3 33 The definition of visual depiction included images gener-
ated by computers or the use of youthful looking adults. 4 Under
the statute, a first time offender may be imprisoned for up to fif-
teen years and repeat sexual offenders face a minimum of five
years in prison.
When the CPPA was constitutionally challenged, the district
court granted summary judgment to the government, disallowing
plaintiffs' claims that these restrictions would deter them from
producing works protected by the First Amendment.336 On review,
the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding portions of the CPPA to be
overbroad because the law unconstitutionally banned images that
were not obscene or were not made using real children.3 7 Four
other circuits have upheld the law. 33' The Supreme Court agreed
with the Ninth Circuit, ruling that certain provisions of the CPPA
were overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment.339 Spe-
331. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (to be codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. § 1) [hereinafter PROTECT Act].
332. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 234 (finding the CPPA over-
broad and unconstitutional).
333. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D) (2000).
334. Id. § 2256(8).
335. Id. § 2252A(b)(1).
336. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, No. C 97-0281VSC, 1997 WL 487758, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1997), affd, rev'd, remanded by 198 F. 3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
337. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999), affd, 533
U.S. 234 (2002).
338. See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 406 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 923 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652
(11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir. 1999).
339. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002).
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cifically, the Court ruled that the government could not rely on
previous cases, which ban child pornography regardless of
whether the images were obscene. Those previous cases required
images using actual minors, which would not occur with com-
puter-generated images or the use of young-looking adults.34 °
Therefore, the pornographic images could only be banned if found
to be obscene34' because such material is not protected by the
First Amendment. Since the CPPA, as written, would prohibit
speech that was not obscene, it violated the Miller standard.342
The Court rejected the government's arguments that this broad
sweep was necessary because virtual child pornography is used to
seduce children or whet pedophiles' sexual appetites.343 Moreover,
the Court did not find persuasive the argument that it is too diffi-
cult for the government to distinguish between computer imaging
and actual child photos.344
In analyzing the statute under the Miller standard, Justice
Kennedy noted that the CPPA suppresses speech that may not
appeal to the prurient interest, is not patently offensive in light of
community standards, and has serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.345 In support of his position he argued that the
CPPA prohibits "[a]ny depiction of sexually explicit activity, no
matter how it is presented .... ,,346 Therefore, the statute would
apply to a picture in a psychology manual as well as books, pic-
tures, and movies that have teenage sexual activity as a theme.3 4v
The Supreme Court was not willing to label Romeo and Juliet,
American Beauty, and other movies and novels as obscene.348 In
addition, the opinion distinguished New York v. Ferber,349 because
that case involved actual child participants and the state had a
compelling interest in protecting the victims of child pornogra-
340. Id. at 256.
341. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973).
342. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 246.
343. Id. at 252-53.
344. Id. at 249.
345. See id. at 246.
346. Id.
347. See id.
348. Id. at 247-48.
349. 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982).
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phy.350 However, no definitive causal link existed between virtual
child pornography and child abuse. 5t
None of the government's arguments- including the argument
that pedophiles may use these images to seduce children or whet
their sexual appetites-were compelling to the Court.352 The
Court reminded the government that speech cannot be prohibited
just because it may be misused, may encourage unlawful acts, or
may fall into the hands of children. 53 Likewise, the restrictions
were not justified because of the government's difficulty in identi-
fying which images were actually computer-generated 4.3 " This ra-
tionale would turn "the First Amendment upside down."355 Justice
Kennedy wrote that "[tihe Government may not suppress lawful
speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech. Protected
speech does not become unprotected merely because it resembles
the latter."356 In addition, the affirmative defense did not save the
statute, because the defense was incomplete and insufficient.357
The Court also held the CPPA section 2256(8)(D), containing
the "conveys the impression" language, unconstitutional.3 " This
provision was even more objectionable to the Court because it
turned on how the speech is presented and not on the context.359
For example, a film that contains no sexually explicit scenes may
violate this section if the trailer "conveys the impression" that it
contains pornographic material involving minors. 6 ° Particularly
disturbing to the Court was that a possessor of such a film may
be convicted even if the movie was mislabeled.3 6' The Court held
that the First Amendment required a more "precise restric-
tion. "362
350. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 249-50.
351. Id. at 249.
352. See id. at 251, 253.
353. See id. at 250-52.
354. Id. at 249.
355. Id. at 255.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 256.
358. Id. at 257; see 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000) (repealed 2001).
359. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 257.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 258.
362. Id.
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Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part, al-
lowed the ban on computer-generated images although she
agreed with the majority opinion that (1) the CPPA's ban on
youthful adult pornography was overbroad and violated the First
Amendment; and (2) the pandering provision (18 U.S.C. §
2256(8)(D)) with its "conveys the impression" language should be
struck down because it was overbroad and not narrowly tai-
lored.363 In finding, however, that the "virtual" child pornography
prohibition passed strict scrutiny and was not unconstitutionally
vague or overly broad, Justice O'Connor utilized a narrowing in-
terpretation to make the "appears to be ... of a minor" language
mean "virtually indistinguishable from."364 This interpretation
would allow the language to be narrowly tailored enough to meet
the government's interests without violating the First Amend-
ment. Furthermore, Justice O'Connor argued that the plaintiffs
failed to show any computer-generated examples that have seri-
ous value or do not facilitate child abuse.3 65 Hence she would up-
hold the statute's ban on computer-generated pornographic depic-
tions that "appear to be" of minors because there had not been a
showing that regulations forbid "a substantial amount of valuable
or harmless speech."
3 66
In explaining why she upheld the ban on computer images as
long as it is not applied to youthful adult pornography, Justice
O'Connor expressed her view that striking a statute down due to
overbreath should be done sparingly.367 As a result, she was only
willing to strike the CPPA down in relation to the youthful adult
pornography. Holding that this was consistent with Congress'
understanding of what material was most dangerous to children,
she noted that, at various other places in the statute, Congress
had only addressed material made with real or virtual minors
and not material involving younger-adult pornography. 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia also dissented but,
unlike Justice O'Connor, would uphold the statute in its entirety.
363. Id. at 260-62.
364. Id. at 264.
365. Id. at 265-66.
366. Id. at 265.
367. Id. at 266.
368. Id.
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The Justices asserted that the CPPA can be read narrowly and
that Congress' only goal was to extend "the definition of child
pornography to reach computer-generated images that are virtu-
ally indistinguishable from real children engaged in sexually ex-
plicit conduct."369 They agreed that this reading, supported by the
CPPA's legislative history, would not violate the First Amend-
ment.370
B. The Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002
("COPPA")
In response to Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,371 the House
proposed the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of
2002 ("COPPA").372 This new law attempted to correct the defi-
ciencies of the CPPA by limiting depictions to computer-
generated images-not youthful looking adults-and replacing
the "appears to be" language with "a computer image or com-
puter-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable ... from,
that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct ....
COPPA would also create new provisions prohibiting producing,
trafficking, and possessing a "depiction that is, or is indistin-
guishable from, that of a pre-pubescent child engaging in sexually
explicit conduct. . . . ",3" The penalties for violation of the statute
were also increased." 5 The bill also deletes the overbroad "promo-
tion" language and replaces it with a new section titled
"[plandering and solicitation."376 The House passed COPPA on
June 25, 2002. 77
Despite Congress' efforts to correct the CPPA's flaws, many
thought COPPA would also be ruled unconstitutional. In a letter
369. Id. at 273 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
370. Id. at 271 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia did not join in the portion of
the opinion discussing the legislative history. Id. at 271 n.2.
371. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
372. H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
bss/dl07query.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
373. Id. § 3(a).
374. Id. § 5.
375. Id. § 8.
376. Id. § 4.
377. Id. § 11.
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to Representatives Lamar Smith (R-Tex-21) and Robert C. Scott
(D-Va-3), the ACLU outlined its objections to the bill section by
section.378 Basically, the authors argued that COPPA is unconsti-
tutional because, among other reasons, it attempts to outlaw
"'virtual child pornography,' where no real child was used in the
production of the material," "attempts to create a category of ob-
scenity per se," "creates an affirmative defense often impossible to
meet," and "invades the privacy of child victims." 379 The ACLU
asserted that this bill would repeat the mistakes already ruled
upon in Free Speech Coalition and also would make new ones.38 °
Specifically, the ACLU objected to the "virtually indistinguish-
able" language and modeled their argument on Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion.38 ' The ACLU noted that a major-
ity of the Court did not agree with Justice O'Connor for the sound
reason that this form of speech can only be prohibited if it is ob-
scene or involves an actual child.8 2 The ACLU's position is that
computer-generated images do not involve a child and therefore
must be taken through the three-part test in Miller.13 The
CPPA's problem of criminalizing speech that was neither obscene
nor involved a minor is repeated in COPPA and could draw into
its net prohibited images that are possessed for legitimate rea-
sons.
384
Similarly, the pandering section has also not been adequately
corrected.385 Again, it is a crime to "'describe' an image contain-
ing a "'visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.' 386 Regardless of whether the actual material is not por-
nographic, a person could go to jail for describing it that way.387
378. Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director, ACLU, and Marvin J. Johnson, Legisla-
tive Counsel, ACLU, to Lamar Smith, Rep., U.S. Congress, and Robert C. Scott, Rep., U.S.
Congress (May 8, 2002) [hereinafter ACLU Letter], at http://www.aclu.orgnews/News
Print.cfw?Ig=10364fc=252 (last visted Mar. 30, 2004).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. (applying the test from New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)).
383. Id.; see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
384. ACLU Letter, supra note 354.
385. See id.
386. Id. (quoting H.R. 4623 § 3).
387. Id.
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The Supreme Court found this unconstitutional before and would
likely do so again.3"'
The same is true of the affirmative defense section allowing a
person to avoid penalties if they can prove that a real child was
not involved in the production of the material.3 9 Like its prede-
cessor, this bill makes it nearly impossible for anyone charged
with distribution or possession to use the defense because they
would likely not have access to that information.39 °
The ACLU attacked brand new sections of COPPA, as well as
these revised sections. For example, the section involving the ob-
scene depictions of a prepubescent child, in their view, creates a
category of obscenity per se which they argued is unconstitu-
tional.391 As with the computer-generated images, the ACLU ar-
gued these depictions must be taken through the Miller test to
determine if they are in fact obscene. 392 The ACLU also took issue
with a new extraterritoriality provision, which would allow the
United States jurisdiction where visual depictions of child por-
nography are made available in the United States, even if the
foreign citizen or business had acted legally in their own coun-
tries.3 93 Finally, the ACLU challenged other sections that they ar-
gued violate the privacy rights of Internet users and the privacy
of child victims. 39
4
C. The Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act)
Although COPPA died in the Senate Judiciary committee, the
Senate passed its own version of a similar bill, known as the
PROTECT Act, in the 108th Congress.395 The ACLU character-
ized this bill as "a dramatic improvement" over COPPA but still
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973)).
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. S. 151, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted).
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unconstitutional.396 According to the ACLU, the bill was unac-
ceptable because it: (1) "[Ilmposes criminal liability on people who
possess or produce material protected by the First Amendment;"
(2) "[C]hills protected speech because it places the burden on the
defendant to prove the material was produced using an adult or
was 'virtually' created;" (3) Includes a "pandering" provision
which sweeps in non-commercial speech and includes the am-
biguous term "purported material"; (4) Restricts the defendant
from providing a defense, in that it frees the government from the
"burden" of producing the actual minor allegedly involved in the
material, and thus "violates the right to confront one's accusers";
and (5) Contains an extraterritorial jurisdiction provision that
may be used by other countries to restrict speech in the United
States.397
One major difference between the House bill and the Senate
bill is that the Senate bill includes the requirement that the de-
piction of what appears to be a minor must also be obscene.398 But
in defining obscene child pornography, it only relies upon two of
the three prongs in Miller-the "patently offensive" prong and the
"literary, artistic, political, or scientific" prong. 9 The ACLU sug-
gests the "prurient interest" prong must be added to cure this de-
fect.40
0
The same problems exist with the affirmative defense section
as did with the CPPA's defenses and the ones in COPPA. This
problem is made even worse by the Senate version, because the
proposed bill imposes criminal liability on those who created ma-
terial before the effective date of the statute. 0 1 As a result, pro-
ducers who did not keep records would be unable to use the de-
fense, much like distributors and possessors who would have
virtually no access to that information.40 2 Although the new pan-
396. See Letter from American Civil Liberties Union, to Patrick J. Leahy, Senator, U.S.
Senate (Feb. 5, 2003), at http'/www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?lD=11806&C=252 (last
visited Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter ACLU Letter to Senate].
397. Id.
398. S. 151 § 6.
399. ACLU Letter to Senate, supra note 372.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
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dering provision is much narrower than in the CPPA, it still
sweeps in non-commercial speech and thus is unconstitutional." 3
The ACLU objects to the provisions limiting the evidence a de-
fendant may utilize, including the prohibition of the defense from
cross-examining the minor." 4 Finally, the ACLU fears that, like
the House bill, this bill's extraterritorial jurisdiction provision
will result in other countries imposing liability on United States
companies for their speech, even though the speech is protected
under the First Amendment.0 5
The Congressional findings accompanying the PROTECT Act
articulate the need for such a broad bill.4 6 The Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition40 7 decision significantly impacted the govern-
ment's ability to prosecute child pornographers." 8 In the Ninth
Circuit alone, the number of prosecutions dramatically decreased
and the only surviving cases were those in which the government
could "specifically identify the child in the depiction."40 9 Because
this is nearly an insurmountable burden on the government due
to technological advances, Congress feared many defendants who
possessed images of real children would escape prosecution, and
therefore drafted the proposed legislation.410
The House passed the PROTECT Act, but not before melding it
with House Bill 1104, an omnibus child crimes bill.41' On April 3,
2003, the Senate questioned the House Amendments to their bill
and agreed to a conference.412 In a race to finish before a two-
week break, Congress passed the PROTECT Act on April 10,
2003.413 The media coverage of the bill barely mentioned the re-
vised sections regulating child pornography, if at all, but instead
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. See S. 151 § 2, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted).
407. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
408. See S. 151 § 2.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted).
412. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 108-66 (2003). The conference report was released to the
House of Representatives on April 19, 2003.
413. See 149 CONG. REC. S5,156 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (recording Senate passage of
the bill); PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1 et seq.).
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focused on the Amber Alert network and changes to sentencing
guidelines. 14
Unfortunately, the part of the PROTECT Act dealing with child
pornography is likely to be overturned again. Only Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and O'Connor voted to uphold the
provision in the CPPA that criminalized computer-generated im-
ages. 15 Two more votes would be necessary to uphold the newest
attempt by Congress to ban virtual pornography. Because virtual
child pornography involves no actual children it must be obscene
to be prohibited. Unless all three prongs of the Miller obscenity
test are woven in the statute, Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer are unlikely to change their votes. The ab-
sence of the prurient interest prong makes it dead upon arrival at
the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the problems with the affirma-
tive defenses and the pandering provisions outlined above give
those five Justices even more reason to reject the law.
V. NON-LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
If, as suspected, the newest law banning virtual child pornog-
raphy gets rejected by the Supreme Court, what else can this na-
tion do to keep children safe from pornography on the Internet?
In November 1998, Congress ordered the National Research
Council ("NRC") to conduct a study to address just that. 16 In re-
sponse, the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board
("CSTB") of the National Academies asked the NRC's Board on
Children, Youth, and Families ("BOCYF") to form a committee
with "expertise diverse enough to address this topic."417 The com-
mittee published a comprehensive report that placed the issue of
child pornography in context and gave a wide range of alterna-
tives for the nation to consider in dealing with this problem.1 In
the report, the committee evaluated several approaches to pro-
414. See Carl Hulse, Bill To Create Alert System on Abduction Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2003, at A22.
415. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 273 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
416. NRC Report, supra note 4, at viii.
417. Id.
418. See id. at 11-13.
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tecting children including the use of public policy, social and edu-
cational strategies, and technology-based tools.419 The committee
ultimately concluded that no solitary approach would fully ad-
dress the problem and that all of the proposed strategies must
mutually reinforce each other to keep children safe. ° Part four of
this article discusses each of these approaches in greater detail.
A. Public Policy
As discussed previously, the regulatory approach has not been
very successful due to various constitutional restrictions. 1 Con-
gress should continue to try to craft laws that will withstand the
strict scrutiny test. Congress has been given very specific guid-
ance from the courts on trying to draft such laws. First, if the im-
age does not involve the use of an actual child, the material must
meet all three prongs of the Miller obscenity test.42 2 Second, all
defendants must be able to avail themselves of any affirmative
defense in COPA.423 Third, the government must make a credible
case that the solution is the least restrictive means to accomplish
the objective. 4 Fourth, any regulation must be narrowly tailored
to this objective. Congress needs to be particularly mindful that
any phrases and terms used must be specific and limited so as not
to be too broad or unconstitutionally vague.425
If such a hypothetical law could ever be constitutionally
drafted, the regulations may ultimately prove ineffective in
shielding our children from harmful Internet content if the inter-
national community does not adopt similar laws.426 While Inter-
net child protection laws will have an impact on both the suppli-
419. See id. at 8-11.
420. See id. at 12.
421. See supra discussion Parts I-III.
422. NRC Report, supra note 4, at 93-94 (discussing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982)).
423. See id. at 102.
424. See id. at 91.
425. See id. at 100.
426. See id. at 12.
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ers and potential consumers of material harmful to minors; this
impact will primarily be in the United States and not abroad.427
However, the NRC report indicated that public policy does not
need to be limited to laws that are penal in nature.42 Public pol-
icy could also be used "to reduce uncertainty in the regulatory en-
vironment; promote media literacy and Internet safety educa-
tion... ; support development of and access to high-quality
Internet material that is educational and attractive to children in
an age-appropriate manner; and support self-regulatory efforts by
private parties."429
B. Social and Educational Strategies
As the case law makes clear, the Internet's very nature makes
it nearly impossible to regulate. The Internet has no boundaries.
No matter what sites the United States prohibits, Internet users
will still be able to access foreign sites. This lack of boundaries
also makes it very difficult to use any type of community stan-
dards test. Communities will differ on what material they find
harmful to minors and these discrepancies will prohibit any soft-
ware program from adequately filtering or blocking potentially
harmful material.430 Yet valid, sexually oriented expression must
not be "silenced completely in an attempt to shield children from
it." 43 ' Therefore, teachers, parents, and communities are ulti-
mately responsible for their children's education and safety while
using the Internet. Because of this, the NRC report noted that
"[tihe most important social and educational strategy is responsi-
ble adult involvement and supervision."432
1. Parental Supervision
Parents must educate their children about what is and is not
appropriate. But even the best parents will not be able to monitor
427. Id. at 359.
428. See id. at 8.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 12.
431. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 235, 251 (2002).
432. NRC Report, supra note 4, at 9.
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their children-especially teenagers-all the time. Parents must
provide their children with the tools to make responsible and safe
choices while using the Internet, including knowing how to access
valuable and appropriate materials on the Internet and also
knowing what to do if they accidentally come across inappropriate
materials or activities. Although technology may help parents in
their endeavor to keep pornography from their children, its im-
perfections make it impossible to be the only tool used in this bat-
tle. In fact, one of the best tools, as recognized by the NRC com-
mittee, is for parents to become familiar with the Internet
themselves.433 In addition, peers and siblings can help parents
educate younger children.434
2. Acceptable Use Policies
Another suggestion of the NRC committee is to encourage fami-
lies, schools, and libraries to adopt and enforce an "Acceptable
Use Policy" ("AUP").435 An AUP is "a written agreement, signed
by students, their parents, and their teachers, outlining the terms
and conditions of Internet use for the safety and educational
benefit of the students."436 These agreements not only deal with
the issues of pornography and obscenity, but also such matters as
copyright and intellectual property laws, defamation, and com-
mercial use of the school provided Internet access.
When designing AUPs, the school or library should remember
that the AUP is a legal document and should be reviewed by an
attorney.43 A good AUP should contain: (1) An overview of what
the Internet is, how it will be used in the institution, and why ac-
cess to it is beneficial to the educational process; 438 (2) Usage poli-
cies and guidelines, including what constitutes acceptable and
unacceptable uses of the Internet;419 (3) Penalties for violating the
433. See id. at 9.
434. See id. at 8.
435. See id.
436. Internet 101: The Internet Guide for Teachers & Parents: Acceptable Use Policies
(AUP's), at http://www.horizon.nmsu.edu/101/html (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
437. See id.
438. See id.
439. See id.
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policies and guidelines of the AUP;" ° (4) A description of the
rights of individuals using the networks in the school or dis-
trict;441 (5) A disclaimer absolving the institution, under specific
circumstances, from responsibility;44 2 and (6) Language clearly
indicating Internet access is a privilege, not a right, and may be
withdrawn." 3
There are many web resources that can aid an institution in
drafting an AUP."4 Taking advantage of the various templates
and suggestions listed on the web is most helpful; however, they
should not be adopted without sufficiently tailoring them to the
needs and philosophies of each individual institution.
Although designing an AUP would appear to be fairly easy and
straightforward, there are many issues institutions should con-
sider before attempting to draft one. If these concerns are ig-
nored, the AUP may be challenged in court-much like the fed-
eral statutes discussed previously." 5 Perhaps the biggest
challenge could be based upon AUP's vagueness. In other words,
does the AUP clearly illustrate to students the difference between
what is considered appropriate and inappropriate behavior and
how such inappropriate behavior could possibly lead to discipline?
If a court determines it does not, the AUP could be ruled uncon-
stitutional.
Many common phrases found in AUPs regarding inappropriate
actions may in fact be vague and subject to court challenges. For
example, phrases such as "[situdents shall not access any objec-
tionable material or inappropriate material""6 or "[s]tudents shall
not post defamatory, inaccurate, abusive, obscene, profane, sexu-
440. See id.
441. See id.
442. See id.
443. See id.
444. Two such resources are: Acceptable Use Policies-A Handbook, at
http://www.pen.kl2.va.us/go/VDOE/Technology/AUP/home.shtml (last visited Mar. 30,
2004) and Critiquing Acceptable Use Policies, at http://www.io.com/-kinnaman/aupes
say.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
445. See supra discussion Parts I-III.
446. See The Learning Technologies Group, Acceptable Use of Internet and Network
Service Policies (Draft), at http://itec.parra.catholic.edu.au/itiswa/PM%20intro/Support.pdf
(last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
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ally-oriented, threatening, offensive, or illegal material"447 do not
clearly indicate to a student what they can and cannot access or
post.44 Not only are the phrases vague, but they are also probably
too broad, sweeping some protected speech within their coverage.
Such vague speech likely has First Amendment ramifications be-
cause a court could find it chills students' free speech. Students
must fully understand what they can and cannot do." 9
Despite these problems, AUPs may go a long way in helping
provide a framework for children to start making good choices
about their Internet use.
3. Internet Safety Education
Just as we teach children about safety with strangers, as com-
munities we should be teaching them about Internet safety. In-
formation and media literacy will help in that regard. 5 ° Children
who are trained with these skills will be less likely to access in-
appropriate material and will be better prepared to handle the
situation when they do.451
The NRC committee recommended that Internet education
should not be limited to children but through public service an-
nouncements and media campaigns should also educate adults
about the nature and extent of the dangers of the Internet. 2
Adults should urge the development of more websites that are
"compelling, safe, and educational."453 Greater availability of
these preferred sites will make it less desirable for children to
seek out inappropriate sites. 4 In addition, schools and libraries
should compile lists of these preferred sites to make available to
parents and children.55
447. See id.
448. Nancy Willard, A Legal Educational Analysis of K-12 Internet Acceptable Use Poli-
cies 8 (1997). A copy of this article is on file with the author.
449. Id. at 9.
450. NRC Report, supra note 4, at 9.
451. See id.
452. See id.
453. Id. at 9.
454. See id.
455. See id. at 250.
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C. Technology-Based Tools
Although this article outlined the deficiencies of current tech-
nological tools, this is not to say that filters and other technologi-
cal tools have no use. In the home setting, filters can be the first
line of defense for parents. Parents must be aware, however, that
filters will not only block inappropriate material but also a large
volume of legitimate material. 56 In addition, some inappropriate
material will escape the filter, so parents must not rely exclu-
sively on technology to protect their children.457 Parents may also
want to monitor the websites their children visit, but they should
be aware that this may have an effect "on the basic trust that is a
foundation of a healthy parent-child relationship."458 Explaining
this practice to the child before monitoring may help maintain
that trust.
Besides filters and monitoring, the NRC report lists several
other tools including content-limited access, labeling of content,
and spam-controlling tools.459 Similar to the filters, these tools all
have disadvantages associated with them. Again, that is not to
say they have no use, but just that parents must weigh the bene-
fits and the detriments before utilizing these tools.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this unsettled area of law, the goal of keeping children pro-
tected from indecent and sexually explicit material on the Inter-
net is shared by virtually all those concerned. How to achieve the
universal goal is subject to intense debate. Legislation to this
point has failed based on "vagueness" and "overbreadth" chal-
lenges. Federal courts have agreed that the laws violated the
First Amendment since they chilled protected speech.
Perhaps the only way to protect children is to take a multi-
faceted approach, including public policy, social and educational
strategies, and the use of technological tools. Each of these ap-
proaches has associated benefits and costs. Of all the strategies
available, supervision by parents, teachers, and librarians is most
456. See id. at 58.
457. See id.
458. Id. at 11.
459. See id. at 268.
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important to ensure that children are not viewing improper ma-
terial on the Internet. Such supervision can become somewhat of
a burden on a teacher or librarian who deals with many children
daily, or a parent who is balancing work and demands at home.
Therefore, it is crucial that we educate our children so that they
can ultimately make their own responsible and safe decisions
when using the Internet. Until the day arrives that technology
advances to cure the defects that currently exist in the filtering
software programs, this debate over how to best protect our chil-
dren without violating the First Amendment will continue.
